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Thomas Grisso, Department of Psychiatry, University of Massachusetts Medical School
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Editor’s note. “Current Issues” appears intermittently and features topics in psychology that are controversial. Articles that reflect different points of view are
published; none are considered comprehensive treatments of the topic, as the section is designed to facilitate debate. Alan J. Tomkins served as action editor for
the section in this issue, which examines recent advances in violence risk assessment, especially communications about risks of violence. Assessments of violence risk are required of most clinical psychologists. As research on violence begins to make possible more reliable estimates of risk, clinicians must have ways
to use and communicate that information effectively. The three articles in this section identify and explore how we can begin to meet this challenge.
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available research indicated that they were accurate no more
than one in three times.
Three things could have happened in the ensuing decade of
the 1980s as a result of this discouraging news: Courts could
have discontinued their reliance on clinicians’ judgments about
patients’ potential for violence; clinicians could have heeded
the news by avoiding roles requiring violence predictions; or
researchers could have given up on the empirical questions of
violence predictions. None of these things happened.
As for the courts, judgments about potential violence were
too much a part of legal standards to relinquish the assistance
of the clinician. Nowhere was the extent of this need more
clearly expressed than in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
in Barefoot v. Estelle (1983), which addressed the reliability
and admissibility of dangerousness prediction by clinicians
in a capital sentencing case. The court reasoned that the need
to assess future violence was inevitable. Someone ultimately
must make the prediction (e.g., judges and juries), and whatever guidance clinicians could give them was important. So
critical was this need that the court was willing to accept clinicians’ violence predictions on almost any terms. After all, the
court explained, mental health professionals’ predictions were
“not always wrong … only most of the time” (p. 901).
Clinicians themselves continued to offer their assessments
of risk of violence, but with varying degrees of certainty.
Heeding the warnings manifested by research, many of them
offered “best estimates” about patients’ potential for violent
behavior while being careful to inform the courts of the limits
of their accuracy. Some were less cautious. But few believed
that they had nothing to offer the courts.

ecent developments in the law have made the assessment of risk of violence a required professional ability for every clinical psychologist. About 30 years
ago, laws controlling involuntary civil commitment evolved
to require more than merely a finding of mental illness. They
also required evidence that patients, if not committed, would
be dangerous to themselves or to others. During that era, states
also developed laws that made it mandatory for clinicians to
report evidence if their child clients, the children of their adult
clients, and disabled or older adults were in danger of abuse
by their caretakers.
Clinicians’ obligations to assess risk of violence were
driven home perhaps most dramatically by the infamous
“Tarasoff case” (Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 1976). Together with subsequent cases across the
states, Tarasoff required that clinicians take measures to protect third parties from their clients’ potential for violence. This
implied that clinicians should take reasonable steps to assess
and be aware of their clients’ potential for violence. Indeed,
by 1978, Shah was able to describe no less than 15 legal and
clinical contexts in which mental health professionals were
expected to assess the risk of violence and would be potentially liable for failing to do so.
Spurred by these new laws, many researchers in the 1970s
began to explore mental health professionals’ abilities to assess violence risk. What they found was in stark contrast to
society’s apparent faith in clinicians’ assessment skills. Summarizing those early studies, Monahan (1981) concluded that
when clinicians predicted that a person would be violent,
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Subsequent research has begun to show that these clinicians may have been right (see, e.g., Lidz, Mulvey, & Gardner, 1993). A “second generation” of violence risk studies during the 1980s and the present decade (Otto, 1992) has given
rise to a new outlook. Ten years after his earlier conclusion,
Monahan’s (1992) review of the new violence risk studies spoke much more optimistically about a growing scientific base of information on violence risk predictors (Hodgins,
1993; Monahan & Steadman, 1994), with the promise of significant breakthroughs by research in progress (Steadman et
al., 1994). When properly translated, the results of the new
generation of violence risk studies might soon provide mental
health professionals with a more reliable scientific foundation
for describing a person’s violence risk, thereby assisting society in deciding when those risks are sufficient to take action to
protect the person and others.
We have not yet achieved this capacity. Yet the time is near
enough that researchers and policy analysts in this field have
begun to address questions beyond the potential accuracy of
violence prediction. Many of these questions pertain to the development of technology that will translate research results so
that they can guide clinicians when applying them to individual cases (e.g., Rice & Harris, 1995; Webster, Harris, Rice,
Cormier, & Quinsey, 1994). What tools would facilitate clinicians’ use of new knowledge in the prediction of violent behavior? How can we best communicate our violence risk estimates in the courts? How do we ensure that new knowledge
and methods will be incorporated into the clinical practice of
risk assessment?
These are the questions addressed by the three articles in
this special section. In the first article, Monahan and Steadman (1996) explore how best to convey violence risk estimates so that they can be understood and translated for decisions by courts, mental health service systems, and society in
general. Their proposal likens the task of violence risk assessment to weather forecasting, especially when meteorologists
seek to predict the “rare and severe event” that threatens damage to property and people.
Can the long experience, advanced technology, and practical orientation of meteorology provide us with a heuristic for
anticipating how we can best communicate violence risk predictions, especially in legal settings? Monahan and Steadman
(1996) propose that it can and that it should lead us to consider
clinical and research alternatives to approaches that currently
predominate. For example, current practice leads clinicians to
think in terms of probabilities when considering estimates of
the likelihood of future violence (Grisso & Appelbaum, 1992).
Whatever value this may have for framing one’s logical processing of clinical information, is it necessarily the best way
to communicate it to others? Should we consider categorical
risk communications, as meteorology has done, rather than
messages containing statements of absolute probability?
One of the features of weather communications, as described by Monahan and Steadman (1996), is to include instructions to the listener about how to respond to the danger
represented by a category of severity of the predicted weather
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conditions. In this approach, the prediction and the way it is
communicated are more than a message about the odds of an
event. The likelihood and the severity of the event are translated into a prescriptive statement about the action that the listener should take.
This presents a conceptual, practical, and ethical problem
that is explored by Schopp (1996) in the second article in this
collection. His concern arises from a fundamental difference
between the social prescriptions that are relevant for responding to severe weather and those that are relevant for responding to serious threats of human violence. In the former, we are
concerned about getting out of the way. In the latter, however,
our social response is more likely to involve incapacitation or
other legal intrusions that will directly affect the liberty of the
person whom we are warned to fear.
The greater moral nature of the latter type of actions raises
questions about psychologists’ role in offering their predictions. What are the proper limits of psychological expertise,
in light of the prescriptive and moral nature of the outcomes
of their predictions? Does the weather-forecasting analogy—
with its prescriptions for action—provide adequate guidance
when applied to violence forecasting? Or does it lead us into
moral territory beyond the scientific expertise of psychology?
In coming years, when we have improved our capacities to
predict future violence and have found proper ways to communicate those predictions, we will need to take further steps
to deal with our newfound knowledge. Clinicians must then
be enabled to use those advances and taught to use whatever
is known about their effective communication. This is the focus of the third article by Borum (1996), a forensic clinical
psychologist. He emphasizes that experimental variables that
have predictive power in research must be translated into usable risk assessment technology. We will need to develop
tools and techniques to meet the practical demands of clinicians and to guide their use of the new knowledge so that it
clearly conveys relevant information to legal decision makers. Borum also explores how we can best teach and disseminate new knowledge and technology in risk assessment, so
that their diffusion will contribute to standards and guidelines
for clinical practice.
These three articles, therefore, are about the future. We are
only now beginning to see the fruits of more than 25 years of
research aimed at improving our capacities to make reliable
and valid estimates of violence risk. With this knowledge will
come increased obligations to use it effectively and responsibly. It is important that we begin to think through how we can
best do that, before the time is suddenly on us. The articles in
this Current Issues section identify part of the agenda for that
process.
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